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Across western democracies, citizens are held to expect much of politicians, yet governments 
are supposed to be ill-equipped to deliver against those expectations. The net result is said to be 
a widespread sense of political disappointment; a negative balance between what citizens 
expect of government and what they perceive governments to deliver. Yet little attention has 
hitherto been paid to which kinds of citizens are particularly disappointed with politics, and 
why. This paper offers one of the first empirical analyses of political disappointment. Drawing 
on a survey conducted in Britain, it quantifies political disappointment and explores which 
social groups are more prone to disappointment than others. The analysis considers whether 
certain groups are more disappointed with politics by virtue of expecting a lot of government or 
by virtue of perceiving government performance in a particularly poor light. 
 




The relationship of citizens to politicians and political institutions in modern times, it is 
sometimes said, is one characterised by disappointment. That is, citizens come to expect certain 
outputs from politics, yet perceive that governments and politicians fall short of these 
standards, resulting in feelings of let-down or disappointment. Political disappointment can be 
defined in terms of thwarted expectations; the discrepancy between what someone expects from 
politics and what they perceive they actually get. Many recent studies have identified a 
pervasive disappointment among citizens in western democracies, and attributed declining 
levels of political trust and democratic satisfaction to a sense of unfulfilled expectations among 
those citizens. Yet we know rather little about disappointment as a phenomenon. What does 
disappointment consist of and where does it derive from? Which groups within the population 
are more disappointed with politics than others? And why? 
 
A number of studies have identified disappointment as a particular pathology of modern 
politics. Contemporary political systems, it is argued, encourage citizens to register multiple, 
and often conflicting, demands on governments, yet deny politicians many of the tools by 
which to respond to these demands (eg. Russell, 2005; Stoker, 2006; Flinders, 2009, 2012, 2014; 
Medvic, 2013; Sleat, 2013; Richards, 2014). The demands made by citizens may derive from a 
number of sources (eg. changing social structures, rising information and education levels, new 
technology and media messages), while the tools available to politicians may be constrained by 
a similar range of factors (eg. globalisation, the nature of the policy issues and depoliticisation 
of the policy process). At root, though, existing analyses of disappointment probe the changing 
nature of citizens’ expectations of politics, alongside the capabilities of political actors to deliver 
on these demands.1 What this study seeks to do is to build on the primarily conceptual basis of 
these studies by developing a more empirical focus in which political disappointment is 
explicitly measured and analysed. This enables us to identify more clearly which groups of 
citizens experience political disappointment, and for what reasons. 
 
Why should we be interested in disappointment? First, because the presence in advanced 
democracies of disappointed citizens is troubling. Disappointment may be an inevitable 
consequence of a politics in which distinct social groups make different, and often conflicting, 
demands on the political system (Stoker, 2006: ch4; Sleat, 2013). Moreover, politicians may do 
well to ignore the expectations of some citizens, particularly where these expectations are ill-
informed or biased (Hatier, 2012). Yet while recognising that some disappointment is probably 
inevitable, and that it is not desirable for politicians to pander to each and every popular whim, 
any evidence of a widespread belief among citizens that their political system is failing to 
deliver what is expected should be a cause for concern. The second reason for exploring 
                                                     
1 The disjuncture between expectations and perceptions is just one ‘gap’ that may arise in citizens’ minds 
when they think about the political system. A second gap reflects differences between people’s 
perceptions of a public service and their actual experience of that service (Laycock, 2009). A third gap 
reflects differences between perceptions of service performance and objective indicators of performance 
(Flinders, 2009). There are therefore gaps relating to ‘expectations’, ‘experience’ and ‘performance’ (as 
well as others; see Flinders, 2012: 14-18), each of which might shape how favourably disposed citizens are 
towards politicians and politics. The focus of this article is on the expectations gap. 
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political disappointment is because it has been shown to generate various negative 
consequences. Unfulfilled expectations among citizens have been shown to contribute to 
feelings of dissatisfaction and discontent with the political system (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 
2002: esp 44-48; Dalton, 2004: 143-54; Norris, 2011) as well as shaping evaluations of public 
services (Appleby and Alvarez Rosete, 2003; van Ryzin, 2004; James, 2009; Poister and Thomas, 
2011; Heath and Curtice, 2012; although see Seyd, forthcoming). Moreover, as I show later on, 
disappointed citizens are less likely to participate in politics than their contented counterparts. 
For both intrinsic and extrinsic reasons, then, there are solid grounds for seeking to measure 
political disappointment and for identifying which groups of citizens are particularly prone to 
disappointment and why. 
 
1. Measuring political disappointment 
 
Disappointment may be defined as a feeling that arises when an outcome or an event that is 
expected fails to materialise. Hence, disappointment is experienced whenever there is a 
disjuncture between the level or quality of an outcome that is expected and that which is 
experienced or perceived (Loomes and Sugden, 1986). The concept has been widely studied in 
fields such as economics, management and psychology, where it is associated with behavioural 
outcomes such as decisional choices, responses to service provision and patterns of social 
interaction (eg. Zeelenberg and Pieters, 1999; Zeelenberg et al, 2000; Martinez et al, 2011). 
Disappointment has also been explored by political scientists where, as just noted, it is most 
frequently invoked as an explanation of growing levels of distrust and disengagement among 
citizens across western democracies. 
 
Disappointment can be measured in a variety of ways. One, direct, measure involves asking 
people about incidents whose outcomes failed to match prior expectations or allocating 
participants to a scenario in which a disappointing result is explicitly laid out (Zeelenberg and 
Pieters, 1999). A second, more indirect, measure – as used here – involves asking fieldwork 
participants about their expectations of some service or outcome followed by a measure tapping 
their perceptions of that service or outcome (Oliver, 1997, ch4; Spreng and Page, 2003). 
Disappointment can then be measured by relating the perceptions score to the expectations 
score. If perceptions fall below expectations, then disappointment is inferred, while if 
perceptions exceed expectations, then elation is inferred. Assuming that expectations and 
perceptions are measured on some ordinal scale, then we can also compute various degrees of 
disappointment. Disappointment will be greatest among people who combine high 
expectations of an outcome with low perceptions of that outcome. Correspondingly, high 
elation will arise from a combination of low expectations and high perceptions of delivery.  
 
To date, empirical research on the twin components of disappointment has, unsurprisingly, 
been devoted to perceptions of performance or delivery. Less effort has been devoted to 
considering the role of expectations. Granted, some studies have explored public expectations 
of politicians and their behaviour (in Britain: Graham et al, 2002; Birch and Allen, 2010; Allen 
and Birch, forthcoming; in the US: Medvic, 2013) and of the democratic system (Butt and 
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Fitzgerald, 2014). Other studies have examined the impact on expectations of information about 
service provision (James, 2011). And, as noted, other studies have examined how expectations 
and perceptions shape levels of trust in, and satisfaction with, public services. But few other 
studies have sought to measure what citizens expect of politicians. In part, of course, this 
reflects the paucity of appropriate data; relatively few surveys ask respondents what they 
expect of public services and political actors. Yet in the absence of such data, the analysis of 
expectations rests more on supposition than on empirical evidence. 
 
To enable political disappointment to be measured, I draw on one of the few British surveys 
that cover not only how people perceive government but also what they expect of it. The annual 
British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey has, since 1985, fielded questions that ask respondents 
whether they think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to deliver various 
public goods. These questions couch expectations in normative form, in terms of what 
government should do, not in anticipatory form, in terms of what they will do. Many previous 
studies in Britain and elsewhere (eg. Kimball and Patterson, 1997; James, 2009; Ipsos MORI, 
2010; Poister and Thomas, 2011) have operationalised expectations in normative terms, asking 
citizens to identify a set of ideal outcomes or qualities. Other studies (such as MORI’s ‘Delivery 
Index’) have measured expectations in anticipatory form. Since desired outcomes are not 
always identical to anticipated outcomes, we should note that measured levels of 
disappointment may be affected by the form in which expectations are assessed. Yet 
disappointment may arise through outcomes that fail to match what is desired as much as 
outcomes that fall short of what is anticipated. The indicators of expectations fielded on the BSA 
survey are thus appropriate to the task of measuring political disappointment. 
 
Alongside questions on expectations of government, the BSA survey posed – in 2000, 2002 and 
2006 – follow up questions asking respondents how far they perceived governments to have 
delivered these public goods. Expectations and perceptions were tested across the widest range 
of public goods in the 2002 BSA survey, and thus it is this survey that is drawn on here.2 In what 
follows, I first set out what people expect of government, how they judge government 
performance and, hence, levels of political disappointment. Having established this basic 
picture, I then identify various explanations for political disappointment and put these 
explanations to empirical test. 
 
2. Quantifying political disappointment 
 
                                                     
2 The BSA 2002 survey employed a multi-stage stratified random sample of people aged 18 and over 
across Great Britain. The fieldwork was conducted between June and September 2002, with interviews 
conducted face to face. The total number of respondents to the main survey was 3435 (a response rate of 
60.9%); the questions on government responsibility and performance were fielded on two of the self-
completion questionnaires, to which 1911 people responded. 
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I begin by examining what British people expect of government, and how they perceive the 
government to perform.3 Expectations are measured by survey items that ask whether it should 
or should not be the government’s responsibility to deliver various public goods: providing a 
job for everyone who wants one, keeping prices under control, providing healthcare for the sick 
and providing a decent standard of living for the elderly. The responses to these questions show 
that, while not all aspects of policy performance are equally prioritised by citizens, overall 
Britons place great store on government responsibility for public goods (Table 1). Measured on 
a scale where 1 equates to a belief that governments are not responsible for the public good and 
4 equates to a belief that governments are responsible for the good, mean expectations all score 




Performance is measured by survey items that ask how successful governments are in 
delivering these public goods. Here, the results show just how negatively performance is 
assessed; only in relation to one policy outcome – providing adequate employment – do as 
many people judge government to have been successful as unsuccessful; on all the other policy 
outcomes, the aggregate judgement is that government performance has been unsuccessful 




So citizens in Britain, in 2002 at least, appear to expect a lot of their governments, but at the 
same time believe those governments largely fail to deliver these desired outcomes. Thus, when 
it comes to disappointment – which involves subtracting respondents’ scores for government 
performance from their expectations scores – we find high levels of disappointment, albeit that 
these levels vary somewhat between policy areas. Disappointment is high on some policy areas 
(notably providing a decent standard of living for the elderly, with a mean disappointment 
score of 1.38) although rather lower on others (notably providing a job for all, with a mean 




Having set out the basic distributions, we can now combine the scores across the four policy 
areas to generate separate summative scales measuring expectations, performance perceptions 
and disappointment.4 The distribution of these scales confirms the skew of opinion towards 
high expectations, low performance perceptions and, combining these two, towards high rates 
                                                     
3 The descriptive data reported in Tables 1-3 are weighted to take account of unequal probabilities in the 
chances of individuals being selected for interview. 
4 The scales for expectations, performance perceptions and disappointment each comprise four items, 
which principal components analyses show to load onto single dimensions with correlations generally at 




of political disappointment. Thus, over nine in ten of the sample indicated they thought 
government “definitely” or “probably” had a responsibility to deliver across the four public 
goods. Yet almost one half felt that governments were “very” or “fairly” unsuccessful in 
delivering on these goods; only one tenth perceived governments to be successful (the 
remaining four in ten being neutral). This translates into high rates of disappointment: almost 
three quarters of the sample manifested various degrees of disappointment, with only one 
quarter being either elated or neutral. The very disappointed (those scoring 2 and 3 on a 
disappointment scale running from -4 [content/elation] to +3 [maximally disappointed]) amount 
to almost one in six of the entire sample. 
  
3. Explaining political disappointment 
 
So far, I have offered one way of measuring and quantifying political disappointment and, 
using this measure, have shown just how prevalent disappointment appears to be among the 
citizens of one particular advanced democracy. There may be other ways in which 
disappointment might be measured, and if a different set of government activities or public 
goods was tested our quantification of disappointment might look rather different. But while 
the indicators presented so far may not exhaust the ways of measuring political 
disappointment, they at least offer a plausible starting point. 
 
The paper now moves on to explore the possible reasons for political disappointment. This is 
not a straightforward task. For a start, many potential explanations for disappointment rest on 
factors relating to how well governments are seen to perform (in terms of economic outcomes or 
the state of public services, say). Yet in this paper’s operationalisation of disappointment, 
performance is already included as one of the core components, and thus cannot also appear as 
a potential predictor variable. Instead, we must seek to explain disappointment by reference to 
a less proximate set of factors, based on citizens’ broad values and social positions. A second 
complicating issue is that the wider literature provides few clues as to why particular citizens 
should be prone to feelings of political disappointment.5 These citizens will – at least as 
disappointment has been defined here – be those who expect much of government but who 
perceive its performance to fall below these standards. Yet it is not clear which citizens might 
fall into this category; it is difficult to pinpoint particular social groups whose members are 
likely to hold consistently high expectations of government yet to judge its performance in 
consistently negative terms, yielding an end-state of political disappointment. 
 
                                                     
5 While various authors have identified the existence of a gap between what citizens expect of the political 
system and their perceptions of what that system actually delivers, analyses of the drivers of this 
‘expectations gap’ are sparse. Recent empirical studies that seek to explain the gap between what citizens 
expect of the political system and what they perceive they receive from it – in relation to factors such as 
presidential performance, democratic performance and the balance between representative and direct 




It is, however, rather easier to pinpoint likely variations among social groups in the twin 
components of disappointment, namely expectations and performance perceptions. Taking 
expectations first, we might anticipate systematic variations in what citizens desire of 
government depending on their level of political knowledge, the regard in which they hold 
politicians and the degree to which they rely on government. Citizens who are politically 
informed and knowledgeable should be more aware of the constraints under which political 
actors operate, and thus less prone to inflated and unrealistic expectations of what governments 
might deliver (Jenkins-Smith et al, 2005; Waterman et al, 2014). We should therefore find lower 
expectations – and thus lower levels of political disappointment – among people who are 
politically knowledgeable than among those who lack political knowledge. Expectations might 
be similarly low among people manifesting distrust in politicians and government (Morgeson, 
2013). Among this group, distrust is likely to reflect a belief that public officials lack the 
competence to deliver appropriate policy outcomes or are little concerned with citizens’ 
interests. Citizens who accept one or both of these positions are hardly likely to expect much of 
public officials. So we should anticipate that expectations of government will be lower among 
distrusting citizens than among their trusting counterparts. The corollary is that, unless 
distrusting citizens also assess government performance in negative terms, their level of 
disappointment should be lower than that among trusting citizens.6 
 
On the other hand, certain social groups may be particularly prone to ‘look to’ government as 
the provider of various goods and services (Jenkins-Smith et al, 2005; Waterman et al, 2014). 
Among such dependent groups, expectations about the role of government are likely to exceed 
those among less dependent groups. We might therefore anticipate higher expectations of 
government among citizens within lower socio-economic groups than among those within 
higher socio-economic groups. We might also anticipate higher expectations among elderly 
cohorts within the population, who tend to be heavily reliant on the state, than among younger 
cohorts. However, expectations may also be high among the youngest age cohort. Members of 
this group are, relative to older age cohorts, likely to have less political experience and fewer 
well-formed political judgements. Those people in the youngest age cohort might therefore be 
supposed to be more idealistic of what political actors should achieve, manifested in higher 
expectations of governments. In each case, higher expectations – among social groups 
dependent on the state, and among the young – should translate into higher rates of 
disappointment.7  
 
                                                     
6 Indeed, one reason for the prevalence of distrust among citizens might be precisely a concern to limit 
positive expectations of politics, expectations that politicians are either unlikely to meet or are incapable 
of meeting. 
7 We might also anticipate expectations being shaped by citizens’ formative political experiences. In 
particular, citizens coming of age in the 1950s and 1960s are likely to have been socialised into holding 
higher expectations of government than among more recent generations, growing up with more obvious 
examples – and claims – of government failure (see, for example, Hay, 2007). Unfortunately, since we 
have no measures of political disappointment over an extended period of time, it is impossible to 
disentangle generational effects from lifecycle ones. 
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A different set of factors may serve to depress perceptions of political performance, and thus – 
without necessarily affecting people’s expectations of politics – to increase levels of popular 
disappointment. Those citizens who are exposed to critical information and commentary on 
politicians’ performance may well reduce their evaluations of government delivery. In Britain, 
the widespread reach of tabloid and middle-market newspapers, and the critical coverage 
adopted by many of these newspapers, suggest that evaluations of government performance 
will be lower among readers of these newspapers than among readers of the ‘quality press’ (ie. 
broadsheet newspapers) and among those exposed to no newspaper at all. A second factor 
likely to affect performance perceptions is partisanship. We would expect supporters of parties 
within government to judge policy performance more positively than supporters of parties 
outside government. However, incumbent party supporters may also hold higher expectations 
of government, while non-incumbent party supporters may expect less. Hence, the net effect of 
partisanship on disappointment is not clear, although by virtue of the strong hypothesised 
effects on performance ratings, we might expect disappointment to be higher among supporters 
of non-governing parties than among supporters of governing parties. 
 
We therefore have a set of general factors that we expect to be associated with political 
disappointment. In particular, disappointment is likely to be higher among citizens with a 
limited understanding of politics, among those who trust politicians, among those dependent 
on government services, among those exposed to critical media messages and among 
supporters of parties outside government. But these characteristics are expected to affect 
disappointment via different routes (see summary of anticipated relationships in Table 4). In 
particular, citizens with low levels of political understanding (including the young), high rates 
of trust and dependence on government services should manifest greater rates of 
disappointment primarily on account of their higher expectations of government. Citizens 
exposed to critical media messages and supporters of parties not in government should 
similarly manifest high rates of disappointment, but this time primarily on account of their 




To measure political information, I use indicators tapping survey respondents’ level of 
education and an indicator of political knowledge in the form of a four item factual quiz on the 
European Union. Political trust is measured by a question on whether government is trusted to 
place national interests before party interests. Dependence on government is assumed to be 
highest among those located in the lower socio-economic groups and among the elderly, and so 
social class and age variables are drawn on. Media exposure is measured through responses to a 
question on newspaper readership, with distinctions drawn between those reading tabloid and 
middle-market8 newspapers (assumed to contain more negative coverage of government 
                                                     
8 Middle market refers to readers of two newspapers (the Daily Mail and Daily Express) with high 
circulations, whose coverage and tone falls somewhere between the low quality tabloid press and the 
high quality broadsheet press. The tabloid category does not include the Daily Mirror, which is usually a 
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performance), broadsheet newspapers and no newspaper at all. Partisanship is measured by a 
question on party identification. (Question wordings, codings and descriptive statistics for all 
the variables are contained in the Appendix.) 
 
Since the BSA measure of expectations asks about what public goods are desired of 
government, this indicator might also tap views on the role of the state. To control for the 
possibility that the indicator might engage respondents’ political values as much as their 
expectations of government, the model includes a variable designed to assess left-right 
ideological position.9 Finally, since previous research has shown that expectations vary between 
men and women (James, 2011; Waterman et al, 2014: 148), I also include a measure of 
respondents’ gender. 
 
As the dependent variables – three separate scales of expectations, performance perceptions and 
disappointment – are measured on scales that are broadly linear in form, the empirical analysis 
is conducted using linear (OLS) regression modelling.10 The results, set out in Table 5,  show 
that disappointment is shaped by various features of individuals’ personal characteristics, their 
social positions and their political inclinations. As hypothesised, levels of disappointment are 
lower among people who are politically informed, namely those educated to university level 
and above and those manifesting high levels of political knowledge. The reason for these lower 
levels of disappointment is as anticipated, namely less elevated expectations of what 
governments should do. The well-educated and politically knowledgeable do not hold lower 
expectations by virtue of depending on, or 'looking to', government less than their more poorly 
educated and informed counterparts, nor by virtue of trusting government less, or of holding 
more anti-statist attitudes. These alternative explanations are all controlled for in the model (in 
the separate terms for social class, age, political trust and ideology). Instead, it looks more 
plausible that the lower expectations among the well-educated and knowledgeable derive from 
a better understanding of what government today is – and is not – capable of delivering. In 
other words, the expectations among politically knowledgeable citizens may be better informed 




                                                                                                                                                                           
strong supporter of the Labour Party (the incumbent administration in 2002) and whose readers might 
therefore be expected to take a more positive view of government performance. 
9 This variable comprises a scale (=0.82) formed from summing the responses to five statements 
designed to gauge economic left-right positions (Evans and Heath, 1995): “Government should 
redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off”, “Big business benefits owners at 
the expense of workers”, “Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth”, 
“There is one law for the rich and one for the poor” and “Management will always try to get the better of 
employees if it gets the chance”. 
10 Since the scales are formed from individual survey questions whose response categories are ordinal, I 
also analysed the data using an ordered logit form; the results are almost identical to those obtained from 




Disappointment also arises among females in large part due to expectations, although here 
expectations are higher – than among males – and consequently levels of disappointment are 
greater. But disappointment arises among citizens who distrust government via a different 
route. The hypothesis was that political distrust would depress what citizens expect of 
government, in turn reducing their tendency to be disappointed. In fact, distrustful citizens do 
not expect less of politicians than do their trusting counterparts; but they do evaluate 
government performance in more negative terms, and this contributes to higher, not lower, 
rates of political disappointment.  
 
Political disappointment only partly reflects patterns of social deprivation. With the partial 
exception of expectations, no clear distinctions emerge among people in different social class 
groups (and even on expectations, it is not people in the lowest social group that are most 
inclined to ‘look to’ government, but those in slightly higher groups).11 When it comes to age, 
there is some evidence, as anticipated, of the elderly expecting more of government than do 
younger age groups (although there is no such evidence for the youngest age cohort). Yet the 
most significant effect of age seems to lie in rosier evaluations of government performance.12 
These positive perceptions of government performance outweigh elderly people’s higher 
expectations of government, meaning that levels of disappointment are lower among this age 
group than among younger age groups.  
 
The results provide only partial support for the hypothesis that political disappointment will be 
higher among readers of tabloid and mid-market newspapers, on account of the more negative 
performance evaluations contained in these media. Readers of these newspapers are more likely 
than broadsheet readers to be politically disappointed. But, particularly in the case of mid-
market newspaper readers, this disappointment springs as much from high expectations of 
government as from negative ratings of government performance. Nor is political 
disappointment strongly distributed on partisan lines. As noted earlier, supporters of 
opposition parties may evaluate government performance negatively (and the results in Table 5 
suggest they do), but unless they also hold high expectations of government (and Conservative 
supporters unsurprisingly expect less of government than do Labour supporters), the impact on 
disappointment will be negligible. Finally people’s left-right ideological values have a strong 
impact, particularly on expectations. The magnitude of this effect is not surprising, since left-
right values are likely to overlap with attitudes towards the desired role of government.13 
 
                                                     
11 Testing the impact of being in a highly marginalised group – the unemployed – showed no significant 
impact on disappointment. Reinforcing the findings presented here, previous research has shown that, 
except in particularly deprived neighbourhoods, there are minimal differences between social classes in 
levels of thwarted expectations concerning public services (Duffy, 2000: 31-32). 
12 A finding mirrored in previous research, which shows that evaluations of public service performance 
are much higher among the elderly than among younger age groups (Duffy, 2000: 28-31). 




We can therefore identify some of the social groupings and individual characteristics associated 
with higher or lower levels of political disappointment. People do not appear to be 
disappointed because of social deprivation and a tendency to ‘look to’ government for support. 
People in lower social class groups are no more disappointed than their higher social class 
counterparts, while the elderly are less, not more, disappointed, largely on account of their 
more positive perceptions of government performance. Nor is disappointment shaped by the 
nature of information received by citizens or by partisan considerations. Instead, 
disappointment appears more strongly shaped by people’s understanding of the political 
system. There are fewer disappointed people among the well-educated and politically 
knowledgeable groups, not because these people are less critical of government performance, 
but because they hold lower expectations of what governments should achieve.  
 
Thus, some of the factors anticipated to shape disappointment appear, in practice, to have little 
or no effect. And, overall, the full set of factors identified as likely to shape disappointment 
performs only a partial role, since they enable us to account for just one fifth of the total 
variance in disappointment, and rather less of the variance in expectations and performance 
perceptions. Among the factors that do shape people’s attitudes towards government we can 
glean the relative size of their effects by computing the degree of change in disappointment, 
expectations and performance perceptions caused by shifting the values of each explanatory 
variable individually, while holding constant the values of all other explanatory variables. The 
relevant figures are shown in the final column of each model in Table 5, headed by the delta 
sign.14 Here, we see that the variable with the greater effect on disappointment is trust; moving 
from trusting government the most to trusting it the least increases mean levels of 
disappointment by more than one full point. Disappointment is also strongly affected by 
people’s ideological values; holding left-wing values markedly increases levels of 
disappointment, largely due to the higher expectations of government these values engender. 
The effects on disappointment of political values and assessments of the political system are far 
stronger than any demographic effects. Yet certain social groupings are associated with distinct 
patterns of political disappointment, in particular education and age. The effects of newspaper 
readership and partisanship turn out to be very weak; levels of disappointment are only 
marginally affected by which paper a person reads or which party they support.  
 
Hence, although levels of political disappointment do vary across groups within the population, 
these variations are not substantial. The distribution of disappointment cuts across, as much as 
reflecting, the social groupings considered here. This is perhaps unsurprising, since as was 
shown earlier, political disappointment is widespread across the population. And the picture 
does not change greatly if we restrict our focus to people who are particularly disappointed 
with government (roughly one in six of the population) or to people who hold particularly high 
                                                     
14 The figures represent the changes in the expected level of the dependent variables that follow from 
changing each independent variable from one value to another (for categorical variables) or from their 
lowest to their highest values (for continuous variables), while holding the values of all the other 
variables constant at their means. These substantive effects – calculated using the Clarify programme 
(Tomz et al, 2003) – are only shown for variables that achieve statistical significance in the models. 
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expectations or particularly lowly performance evaluations. Indeed, when we focus on these 
groups, we find rather fewer factors emerging as significant predictors from the models.15 
Disappointment is better thought of as a graduated scale than as a binary ‘either/or’ condition. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Political disappointment has been identified as one of the most serious ‘pathologies’ of modern 
politics. It also has potentially important effects on political outcomes. Several recent studies 
have suggested that political performance that falls below citizens’ expectations serves to 
depress a willingness to trust government. The effects of unfulfilled expectations are not limited 
to attitudes, but also extend to the way citizens behave. Disappointment is often found to 
trigger feelings of powerlessness and apathy (Zeelenberg et al, 2000). People who are 
disappointed with politics may retreat from engagement, on the grounds that they feel unable 
to shape outcomes in the desired manner. This disengagement is manifested in politics as much 
as in other walks of life. Thus, when using the same BSA survey, but drawing on measures of 
political engagement, we find that disappointment exerts a depressive impact on participation. 
Thus, among our sample, turnout at the 2001 British general election among the politically 
content was reported to be 78%, while rather lower among the disappointed, at 68%. The impact 
on other forms of conventional participation is even starker: faced with a law of which they 
disapproved, 66% of the politically content indicated they would contact their Member of 
Parliament, against just 47% of the most disappointed. Political disappointment is thus 
consequential, both for how benignly citizens view political actors and for their propensity to 
engage with the political system. 
 
The analysis presented here is one of the first attempts to shed some empirical light on political 
disappointment. To be sure, the findings are suggestive rather than definitive. For a start, the 
analysis of disappointment draws on citizens from a single country and from a single point in 
time. Moreover, disappointment is gauged by reference to a particular set of government policy 
functions. The nature, and correlates, of disappointment might well differ in other national 
contexts, at other time periods and by using other policy functions as referents to measure 
expectations and perceptions of performance. Another reason for caution is that the measure of 
disappointment used in this analysis involves expectations of what governments should do, 
rather than of what they are likely to do. While previous studies have measured expectations in 
their desired form (ie. what governments should do), it might make more sense to measure 
expectations in their anticipated form (ie. what government is likely to do). Disappointment in 
politics is arguably more likely to arise from a sense that political outcomes fail to match those 
that were anticipated than from those that were desired. While disappointment may reflect a 
sense that perceived outcomes fail to meet desired outcomes, if we are interested in probing 
disappointment more fully, it would be helpful to gather data on what citizens anticipate from 
politics, as well as what they desire from it. 
                                                     
15 The modelling here uses a binary logit form, contrasting groups manifesting particularly high levels of 




Notwithstanding these caveats, the results set out here suggest that disappointment may be 
considered a pathology of politics today; getting on for three quarters of British citizens 
manifest some form of political disappointment. Yet while disappointment appears to be fairly 
widespread, its distribution is not wholly even across the population, and the variations 
uncovered provide us with some clues as to its causes. The guiding assumption was that 
disappointment would be higher among groups prone to inflated expectations and among 
groups primed to perceive political performance in negative terms. The results show that these 
assumptions are partially correct. Disappointment is lower among better informed citizens, 
since these individuals tend to set more modest expectations of what politicians should deliver. 
Yet expectations are not particularly inflated among social groups dependent on government, 
or if they are – as is the case with the elderly – these expectations are matched by more positive 
assessments of government delivery. And, while perceptions of government performance are 
shaped by partisanship, this doesn’t translate into feelings of disappointment. Instead, the effect 
of low performance perceptions in stimulating disappointment is most evident among people 
who distrust government. 
 
What do these findings suggest might be done to overcome, or at least to reduce, feelings of 
disappointment among citizens? In truth, the results outlined here do not yield a clear and 
precise set of guidelines for policy makers. For a start, there are no stark variations in 
disappointment among social groups, and so few clear demographic targets for policy makers 
to focus on. Since the results suggest that levels of disappointment are lower among the well-
educated and informed sections of the population, one strategy might be to boost levels of 
political knowledge; the more that people understand about politics, the lower their 
expectations appear to be and thus the less likely they are to experience disappointment. 
However, raising levels of political awareness and understanding across a population is a 
difficult and long-run task. What other strategies might be adopted to counter political 
disappointment? 
 
Since disappointment has been defined as the gap between a perceived outcome and an 
expected outcome, one obvious strategy is to improve levels of perceived performance while 
limiting what citizens expect government to deliver. However, as countless governments have 
discovered, it is difficult to raise performance levels, and even if this can be achieved, citizens’ 
perceptions of performance often lag behind objective improvements (the ‘performance gap’ 
identified earlier, in fn1; see also Paldam and Nannestad, 2000). It might be thought easier to 
tackle disappointment by reducing what citizens expect of government. Indeed, studies within 
social psychology have suggested that individuals may feel less of a discrepancy between what 
they expect from an outcome and what they actually experience if prior expectations are 
minimised (Van Dijk et al, 2003). Yet limiting public expectations may not be straightforward. In 
a recent analysis of public expectations about public services, James (2011) showed that 
normative expectations of government are only weakly sensitive to actual levels of government 
performance. While high performance tends to stimulate what citizens expect of government, 
poor performance does little to dampen those expectations. Thus, as James notes, it is unlikely 
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that policy makers will be able to restrict popular expectations by pointing to low levels of 
government performance.  
 
Perhaps a broader approach is needed. If analysts such as Stoker (2006) and Flinders (2012) are 
right, that disappointment arises in large part because citizens impose numerous, often 
conflicting, demands and expectations on government – expectations that governments struggle 
to meet – then political actors surely have a redemptive role in conveying to citizens just what is 
involved in decision making, particularly by highlighting the compromises and trade-offs that 
are often required. As Stoker forcefully argues, the political realm is not akin to the personal 
realm; the citizen is not equivalent to the consumer. Instead, politics involves adjudicating 
between demands, and sometimes sacrificing some citizens’ goals in order to meet others’. 
Perhaps one way to limit levels of disappointment is to educate the public on the complexities 
of decision making in a large and diverse polity such as Britain. This, of course, runs up against 
the incentives that politicians face to promise the earth in the hope of attracting votes. This 
‘collective action problem’ will only be overcome if politicians can agree among themselves 
about the benefits they are all likely to reap from being more open and honest about what 




Appendix: Question details and descriptive statistics 
 
Label Wording Min Max Mean SD N 
       
Expectations of government      
On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to … provide a job for 
everyone who wants one/keep prices under control/provide healthcare for the sick/provide a decent 
standard of living for the elderly? 
Summed six point scale (4 items, =0.61) running from 1=low 
expectations to 4=high expectations 
+1 +4 3.56 0.42 1725 
       
Perceptions of government performance      
Irrespective of whether you think it ought to be the government’s responsibility, how successful do you think 
governments have been in recent years at ensuring that … everyone who wants a job has one/prices are kept 
under control/everyone has good access to adequate healthcare/all elderly people have a decent standard of 
living? 
Summed 14 point scale (4 items, =0.77) running from 1=very 
unsuccessful to 5=very successful 
+1 +5 2.80 0.83 1757 
       
Disappointment      
Sum of expectations scale minus performance scale       
Seventeen point scale (=0.75) running from -4 (content/elation) to +3 
(disappointment) 
-4 +3 0.78 0.98 1656 
       
Explanatory variables      
Education: completed education 0=below university, 1=university and 
above 
0 1 0.30 0.46 3411 
Political knowledge: correct answers to four item factual knowledge 
quiz on the EU, 0=≤2 correct answers, 1=≥3 correct answers 
0 1 0.44 0.50 3435 
Distrust: 1=high trust, 4=low trust 1 4 2.98 0.77 2235 
Social class: five categories comprising professional (reference), 
intermediate, small employers, technical and routine occupations 
1 5 - - 3337 
Age: six age categories comprising 45-54 (reference) up to 65+ 1 6 - - 3431 
Gender: 0=male, 1=female 0 1 0.56 0.50 3435 
Newspaper readership: six categories comprising broadsheet 
(reference), no paper, tabloid, mid-market, other and Daily Mirror. 
1 6 - - 3435 
Party identification: five categories comprising Labour (reference), 
Conservative, Liberal Democrat, other party and no party 
1 5 - - 3435 
Left-right ideology: summed 30 point scale (five items, =0.82), running 
from 1=right wing to 5=left wing 
1 5 3.50 0.77 2816 
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Table 1: Expectations of government  
 Level of expectation (%)  
 Should not be Should be   
Government responsibility: Definitely Probably Probably Definitely Mean* N+ 
       
Provide healthcare for the sick 0 1 12 87 3.86 1860 
Provide decent standard of living for 
elderly 
0 1 17 82 3.80 1850 
Keep prices under control 1 4 40 56 3.51 1815 
Provide a job for everyone who wants 
one 
7 15 43 36 3.07 1767 
       
* Mean score: 1=definitely should not be, and 4=definitely should be 
+ Excludes those who did not answer the question or who answered ‘cannot choose’.  
Question wording: “On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to …?” 
Source: British Social Attitudes 2002 
 
 
Table 2: Assessed performance of government  
 Degree of government success (%)  
 Unsuccessful  Successful   
Government performance: Very Fairly Neither Fairly Very Mean* N+ 
        
Everyone who wants a job has one 8 24 30 36 2 3.01 1827 
Prices are kept under control 11 28 24 33 4 2.92 1828 
Everyone has good access to 
adequate healthcare  
15 28 21 34 2 2.80 1847 
All elderly people have a decent 
standard of living  
23 34 22 19 2 2.42 1850 
        
* Mean score: 1=very unsuccessful, and 5=very successful 
+ Excludes those who did not answer the question or who answered ‘cannot choose’.  
Question wording: “Irrespective of whether you think it ought to be the government’s responsibility, how successful 
do you think governments have been in recent years at ensuring that …?” 
Source: British Social Attitudes 2002 
 
 
Table 3: Levels of disappointment across different policy areas 
 Disappointment (%)   
 Low  High  Mean* N 
 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3   
           
Provide decent standard of living for 
elderly 
0 0 1 7 21 20 30 22 1.38 1827 
Provide healthcare for the sick 0 0 0 7 33 20 26 14 1.07 1826 
Keep prices under control 0 0 3 20 27 21 19 9 0.59 1785 
Provide a job for everyone who wants one 0 2 9 23 31 18 12 4 0.06 1742 
           





Table 4: Summary of hypothesised relationships 
    
 Expectations Performance Disappointment 
    
High political information and knowledge Low - Low 
Low political trust Low - Low 
Social groups dependent on government High - High 
Exposure to critical media - Low High 
Non-incumbent government partisanship - Low High 
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Table 5: The determinants of disappointment, expectations and performance perceptions 
 Disappointment Expectations Performance 
 Coef se  Coef se  Coef se  
          
Higher education and above -0.14 0.06* -.20 -0.27 0.09** -.35 0.07 0.05  
(below higher education)          
High political knowledge -0.12 0.05* -.12 -0.25 0.07** -.28 0.05 0.04  
          
Social class (manager/professional)          
Intermediate 0.06 0.08  0.26 0.12* .05 0.02 0.06  
Small employers 0.10 0.09  0.21 0.15  -0.04 0.08  
Technical 0.10 0.08  0.44 0.12** .14 0.01 0.07  
Routine 0.03 0.06  0.16 0.10  0.00 0.05  
          
Age (45-54)          
18-24 0.05 0.10  0.16 0.16  -0.03 0.08  
25-34 -0.05 0.08  0.00 0.12  0.03 0.06  
35-44 -0.07 0.07  0.12 0.11  0.08 0.06  
55-64 -0.22 0.08** -.28 0.11 0.12  0.21 0.06** .29 
65+ -0.36 0.07** -.35 0.23 0.12* .14 0.41 0.06** .37 
          
Female (male) 0.15 0.05** .14 0.17 0.07* .18 -0.10 0.04* -.09 
          
Distrust 0.31 0.03** 1.04 0.07 0.05  -0.29 0.03** -.97 
          
Newspaper read (broadsheet)          
No paper 0.19 0.08* .04 0.43 0.12** .07 -0.08 0.06  
Tabloid 0.27 0.10** .07 0.26 0.15  -0.21 0.08** -.03 
Mid-market 0.36 0.09** .11 0.48 0.14** .22 -0.24 0.08** -.04 
Other 0.21 0.11  0.40 0.18* .29 -0.13 0.09  
          
Party identification (Labour)          
Conservative 0.21 0.06** .04 -0.21 0.10* -.03 -0.29 0.05** -.04 
Liberal Democrat 0.11 0.07  -0.09 0.12  -0.15 0.06* -.08 
Green/Other 0.16 0.11  -0.24 0.18  -0.22 0.09* -.12 
No party 0.13 0.07  -0.13 0.10  -0.14 0.05* -.16 
          
Left ideology 0.25 0.03** .85 0.45 0.05** 1.95 -0.14 0.03** -.36 
          
Constant -1.37 0.18**  1.92 0.29**  4.35 0.15**  
       
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
R2 0.20  0.16  0.18  
N 1593  1654  1690  
       
For categorical variables, the reference category is given in brackets. 
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 shows the change in the expected value of the dependent variables caused by moving the value of the 
independent variable from its base or lowest value, while holding constant the mean values of all other 
variables. 
** p≤0.01 *p≤0.05; two-tailed tests. 
 
